C-27J Spartan (e c-27A/g222)

[Vultur]

Veramente il C17 è fuori. Mi pare proprio un altro livello.

[MatteF88]

Veramente il C17 è fuori. Mi pare proprio un altro livello.

Beh ma infatti non li ho mica messi sullo stesso piano.

[MatteF88]

Chiudo l'OT aggiungendo

[richelieu]

Io invece lo continuo (l'OT) segnalando che sul numero di Marzo del mensile "Volare" .....



..... c'è un articolo di complessive sette pagine dedicato al C-17 .....
Del gigantesco cargo si dice, in copertina ..... "E' un caccia ma non lo sa" ..... per non parlare poi del titolo dell'articolo stesso ..... "Un caccia da 260 tonnellate" .....

E' grande come un palazzo, ma atterra in spazi da ultraleggero.
Vira a coltello e, negli avvicinamenti tattici, scende con quattro motori in reverse a 18mila piedi al minuto.
Abbiamo provato in volo lo straordinario gigante Boeing,
Nato per il trasporto, ma con la vocazione "single pilot".

A quanto pare lo "Spartan" ha trovato un temibile concorrente .....

[MatteF88]

Ve lo immaginate il c-17 che al RIAT (tanto per dire un air show) piazza un bel loop come questo spartan?

[MatteF88]

E' grande come un palazzo, ma atterra in spazi da ultraleggero.
Vira a coltello e, negli avvicinamenti tattici, scende con quattro motori in reverse a 18mila piedi al minuto.
Abbiamo provato in volo lo straordinario gigante Boeing,
Nato per il trasporto, ma con la vocazione "single pilot".

A quanto pare lo "Spartan" ha trovato un temibile concorrente .....

Ho comprato apposta "volare" per leggere quell'articolo...impressionante! il c-17 meriterebbe quasi un thread solo per lui..che prodigio della tecnica..

[richelieu]

Tornando allo "Spartan" .....

Negli Stati Uniti continuano, a livello politico, i dubbi sulla chiusura, da parte dell'USAF, del programma relativo all'acquisizione dei C-27J ..... e il "Senate Armed Services Committee" ha ascoltato nei giorni scorsi il CSM dell'US Army generale Odierno che ha parlato in termini assai favorevoli delle operazioni dell'aereo in Afghanistan .....

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/03/09/csa-p ... ghanistan/

Al tempo stesso ..... è emersa l'ipotesi di un futuro impiego dello "Spartan" da parte della USCG .....

http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/ ... l-031112w/

..... cosa che, se si realizzasse, eviterebbe che una ventina di esemplari dell'aereo vengano immessi sul mercato a prezzi troppo concorrenziali .....

[richelieu]

L'articolo è lungo ..... ma merita un'attenta lettura ..... in quanto questo litigio pubblico fra Air Force e Air National Guard fa venire alla luce interessanti retroscena riguardanti la cancellazione del programma C-27J .....

U.S. Air Force, Air Guard Lock Horns Over Cuts

Mar. 12, 2012 - 05:34AM
By KATE BRANNEN and MARCUS WEISGERBER

As the U.S. Air Force goes head-to-head with the Air National Guard and governors from around the country, all eyes are watching to see how the Air Force fares in its effort to shed reserve capabilities as it deeply cuts spending.

So far, the Air Force has taken heat not only over its plan to cut Air Guard force structure and aircraft, but also the tactics it’s using to make its case on Capitol Hill.

For example, a briefing by an Ohio Air Guard captain being circulated inside the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill makes the case that the Air Force inflated the life-cycle costs of the C-27 transport program as one of the justifications to cancel the effort, which was intended for the Air National Guard.

Guard sources said the move is the latest misstep the Air Force has made in crafting and now defending its budget plan, which cuts 3,900 active-duty, 5,100 Guard and 900 reserve airmen. Air Force leadership, in a statement, said the Guard and active forces worked together on the plan.

This is all happening as the country’s adjutants general — the leaders of the Air and Army Guard within their states — were scheduled to meet in Washington over the weekend for the annual spring meeting of the board of directors of the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS).

The board meeting is a chance for the adjutants general to reinforce their opposition to the Air Force’s plan and vow to do everything they can, working with Congress, to reverse it, said Army Maj. Gen. Frank Vavala, the adjutant general for Delaware and chairman of the NGAUS board of directors, in a March 9 interview.

The Army is watching this fight closely. It wants to see if the Air Force will get away with drastically reducing its Guard structure, one Army source said. A lot is at stake in this first round of fighting, and the lessons that emerge from it will shape where the Army decides to cut its force structure, the source said.

“I think the Army is looking out there to see how the Air Force fares before they take a run at us,” Vavala said.

The Air Force’s plans have drawn the ire of almost all of the country’s governors, who asked Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in a Feb. 29 letter, to reconsider the proposed Air Guard cuts.

Opposition is so strong that the Council of Governors — an organization that includes governors from across the country, as well as DoD leaders — has taken the unusual step of developing an alternative proposal for how the Air Force can make its cuts. The price tag for the proposal, which remains under tight wraps, is being worked out by the Air National Guard staff and Headquarters Air Force staff, Air National Guard head Lt. Gen. Harry “Bud” Wyatt said on Capitol Hill March 7.

The Council of Governors, which includes nine state leaders, was created to give the states access and a voice with the Defense Department, Vavala said. Obviously, the Air Force did not include them in their deliberations, he said.

“Right now, there is active negotiation between the National Governors Association and the Department of the Air Force on this plan to take the Guard down,” Vavala said. “We’re hoping to see some movement.”

The C-27J is one piece of this larger picture, he said.

“It’s not rocket science to know that Ohio is upset about the loss of the C-27 and actually, as a taxpayer, I’m offended by it too,” Vavala said.

The Ohio Guard operates the C-27J in Afghanistan. It is the only unit that has used the plane in combat.

“Here, we’ve got a brand new airframe that’s already proven its ability to fly that last tactical mile and we’re going to send it to the boneyard. Talk about flawed logic, that’s got to be paramount,” Vavala said.

Air Force officials have said the decision to cancel C-27J was driven by a shift in strategy and dropping budgets, adding that they can meet mission requirements with their existing fleet of C-130 and C-17 transports.

But C-27J supporters say the smaller planes are uniquely capable of reaching units in austere locations.

A 37-page briefing by Ohio Air National Guard Capt. Dave Lohrer contends the Air Force has intentionally inflated the life-cycle costs of the C-27J in documents provided to Congress to help justify the service’s decision to cancel the program. The aircraft is built by L-3 Communications and Italian firm Alenia Aermacchi.

In comparing the twin-engine aircraft to the larger four-engine C-130, the Air Force used worst-case scenarios to boost the C-27J’s lifecycle costs by hundreds of millions of dollars per year, the briefing says.

Air Force leadership, which has spent the past month defending its decision to cancel the C-27J program during congressional hearings, has repeatedly said the service could not afford to fly and maintain the fleet.

“The C-27 life-cycle cost over 25 years is $308 million an aircraft,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz told the House Armed Services Committee on Feb. 28, using the number Lohrer questions in his briefing. “For the C-130J, it’s $213 million per aircraft. For the C-130H, it’s $185 million per aircraft.”

The briefing by Lohrer states that the Air Force inflated the number of crew and maintenance personnel needed to operate the C-27J. The briefing contends that fewer airmen are needed when compared with the C-130, which needs a flight engineer and navigator.

The Guard contends the Air Force factored an additional 53 people into its analysis, adding more than $112 million to the life-cycle cost estimate. Air Force officials at the Pentagon were huddling last week to counter Lohrer’s analysis, sources said.

When asked for comment, an Air Force spokeswoman forwarded a statement attributed to Schwartz.

“Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while maintaining the ability to execute strategic guidance. Our Total Force programmed reductions follow detailed assessments of future conflict scenarios and rotational requirements consistent with the new strategic guidance.”

Guard leaders dispute that, saying that while Air National Guard representatives sit in on high-level Air Force budget meetings, they are outnumbered in voting on plans.

“We don’t feel that we were part of the Air Force’s discussions, and we weren’t able to input the fact that our Air National Guard is the country’s most economical force,” Vavala said. “Why would you want to divest yourselves of a battle-proven force that’s got all of this experience and can do it at a fraction of the cost of the active component?

“Don’t forget, the active services didn’t want National Guard Bureau Chief Gen. Craig McKinley on the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Vavala said. The Guard won that fight with Congress, which made the Guard leader a member of the advisory group in the latest defense authorization act.

While the case mounts against the Air Force’s cuts to the Air Guard, the service is looking to back up the analysis that supports its plans.

The Wall Street Journal reported March 7 that the Air Force had commissioned a Rand Corp. study that supports its claim that Guard units are not necessarily cheaper than the active-duty Air Force.

Asked about the C-27J briefing, the Air Force forwarded a copy of the Rand study to Defense News.

Staff writer Jill Laster contributed to this report.

http://www.defensenews.com/article/2012 ... |FRONTPAGE
.

[richelieu]

Gli Afghani si addestrano ..... con l'assistenza dell'USAF .....

Spartans, Instruct!

Air Force advisors from Laughlin AFB, Tex., are flying C-27A airlift missions alongside Afghan air force crews, simultaneously mentoring the Afghans, organizing the Afghans' new unit, and conducting combat support from Kabul airport.
"On one level, we are teaching the Afghan members how to set up and run a traditional, western-style airlift squadron," said Maj. Allen Smith, who is deployed to Kabul from Laughlin's 86th Flying Training Squadron.
An Air Force instructor pilot and loadmaster advisor fly along on each mission, providing one-on-one tutoring of the Afghan crews in the course of everyday support operations in theater.
"Some of the Afghan pilots we fly with have been flying for years, but they were trained in very unorthodox ways," making instructor experience invaluable, explained Capt. Mathew Bruckner, deployed from Laughlin's 47th Operations Group.

(Laughlin report by SrA. Scott Saldukas ..... http://www.laughlin.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123293893 .....)

Fonte ..... Daily Report (AFA) Friday March 16, 2012

[Toeloop]

Ma quello della foto non dovrebbe essere uno Spartan.. con le eliche tripala sono piu' portato a pensare che sia il "Gigio" G-222. A meno che non abbiano fatto uno Spartan con le eliche tripala per l'USAF.

[sidew]

i C-27A che svolazzano con i colori della air force afghana sono i nostri ex G222 AMI revisionati e girati dagli americani.

[richelieu]

Ma quello della foto non dovrebbe essere uno Spartan.. con le eliche tripala sono piu' portato a pensare che sia il "Gigio" G-222. A meno che non abbiano fatto uno Spartan con le eliche tripala per l'USAF.

i C-27A che svolazzano con i colori della air force afghana sono i nostri ex G222 AMI revisionati e girati dagli americani.

Infatti ..... si tenga però presente che la designazione "C-27A Spartan" venne assegnata dall'USAF a dieci G.222 acquistati nel 1990 ed impiegati in operazione "speciali" in America Latina .....

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... t/c-27.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... /c-27a.htm



Colombia 1993 .....


Panama 1997 .....

Nel 1999 gli aerei vennero ritirati e messi a riposo nel "cimitero" della Davis-Monthan AFB ..... ma, pochi anni dopo, il Dipartimento di Stato ne ha resuscitati quattro per proprie "particolari" necessità .....


Colombia 2007 .....


Colombia 2009 .....

[tom75]

i C-27A che svolazzano con i colori della air force afghana sono i nostri ex G222 AMI revisionati e girati dagli americani.

vi confermo con certezza che è così. il giro è AMI, Alenia,Usaf,forza aerea afgana. i veivoli sono consegnati a Capodichino.

[richelieu]

i C-27A che svolazzano con i colori della air force afghana sono i nostri ex G222 AMI revisionati e girati dagli americani.

vi confermo con certezza che è così. il giro è AMI, Alenia,Usaf,forza aerea afgana. i veivoli sono consegnati a Capodichino.

Qualche dettaglio .....

http://www.aleniana.com/g-222-aircraft- ... ac-program

http://www.aleniana.com/files/9.20.11%2 ... 0FINAL.pdf

[richelieu]

Altro lungo articolo ..... l'USAF replica all'Esercito e tenta di discolparsi ..... Non abbiamo gonfiato i costi del C-27J .....

USAF: We Didn’t Inflate C-27J Costs

Mar. 19, 2012 - 03:29PM
By MARCUS WEISGERBER and KATE BRANNEN

The U.S. Air Force — stung by accusations that it’s inflating the cost of flying the C-27J cargo plane as an excuse to cancel the program — is playing damage control.

The service went on the offensive last week after a captain with the Ohio Air National Guard made the case that the actual cost to fly the Italian-built plane is significantly lower than the Air Force has been claiming.

Meanwhile, the Army and Air Force continue to debate exactly which service should be in charge of such aircraft during combat operations.

The briefing by Guard Capt. Dave Lohrer has gone viral within the defense community, so much so that Lohrer was summoned to Washington last week to brief congressional defense committee staffers on his analysis.

The Air Force maintains the total life-cycle cost of the C-27J — built by Alenia Aermacchi — is $308 million per aircraft. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz used the number as recently as Feb. 28 while addressing congressional lawmakers. Lohrer argues the number is closer to $100 million.

The Air Force has not been able to explain the numbers in Lohrer’s briefing, Kevin Williams, deputy director of the Air Force’s studies and analyses, assessments and lessons learned directorate, said at a March 16 briefing at the Pentagon.

Williams speculated that Lohrer might have been using outdated data that threw off his computations.

“That then becomes the basis for kind of like in a math problem where you have a wrong number on the first step of your process and that error ripples through everything else,” Williams said.

The Air Force argues the quad-engine C-130 can carry more troops and supplies longer distances than the smaller, twin-engine C-27J. The fiscal 2013 budget request, if enacted, would terminate the program. The service is still deciding what to do with its existing C-27s, which could be maintained, transferred to another service or sold to a foreign country.

The Air Force claim is not only counter to Lohrer’s briefing, but also to an analysis by the Pentagon’s Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) group, which shows that over 30 years it would cost the Air Force $270 million to fly one C-27J at 400 hours per year using a reserve component crew. This is compared to $163 million for the C-130H, using the same parameters.

But Lohrer contends that it would cost the Air Force about $105.9 million per C-27J, provided the planes were organized in squadrons of similar size to the C-130s. Under that arrangement, CAPE says it would cost $166 million per C-27J.

Asked how the Air Force and CAPE came up with different estimates, Williams said: “You take the $308 [million] and you can make some changes about life cycle so instead of 25-year, you could compute a 30-year. It’s going to drive it down because it lasts longer.”

Lohrer’s analysis questions the Air Force plan to use an additional 53 people to support the C-27J. But Williams said those additional people were included in Air National Guard documentation.

“There’s an assertion in the report that personnel was somehow inflated by the Air Force. Those personnel numbers were the Guard’s numbers,” Williams said. “We’ve got the source document where the Guard provided them.”

Williams also questioned the flying-hours cost referenced by Lohrer as well as depot cost estimates.

The Air Force “normalized operational cost per flying hour” for the C-27J at $9,000 per hour, Williams said. For the C-130H, the per-hour rate is $10,386; for the C-130J, it is $9,111.

Army, Air Force Negotiations
Meanwhile, the Army and the Air Force continue to negotiate how the Air Force will provide critical airlift support to the Army in a way that is agreeable to both services in the aftermath of the C-27J cancellation. The debate includes designating who’s actually in charge of that aircraft.

The Army says the best way to operate during combat is to give the ground commander tactical control of the Air Force aircraft so that he can quickly task them as needed. To do this most efficiently, the Air Force aircraft and crew would be co-located with the Army unit on the ground.

The Air Force’s preferred way of doing business is to keep tactical control with an Air Force commander, with the Army commander able to assign flying sorties from the general airlift pool.

The latest memorandum of understanding (MoU), signed by both service chiefs Jan. 27, leaves the door open to both options. While the document represents a compromise, many in the Army are questioning the Air Force’s commitment to doing the mission.

Responding to skeptics, Schwartz has repeatedly said the Air Force will perform this mission or “die trying.”

For many, the transfer of the C-27J program from the Army to the Air Force and the resulting angst it has caused among the services is just the latest round in a fight that is as old as the Air Force itself.

A retired Army aviation official compared it the Peanuts cartoon series, saying the Army is Charlie Brown and the Air Force is Lucy. Just when the Army — the kicker — thinks it’s going to get support, the Air Force pulls the football back, he said.

Following the Army’s 2009 withdrawal from the C-27J program and the transfer of the plane’s mission to the Air Force, the two services hashed out a plan for the Air Force to provide time-sensitive direct airlift support to the Army. At the time, the Air Force agreed to give the Army tactical control of the aircraft and decided to try out the concept of employment in Iraq.

There, the Air Force’s 164th Airlift Squadron performed airlift missions, using C-130s, at the direction of the commander of the Army’s 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB).

The Army commander was able to directly task C-130 aircraft and airmen to the missions he deemed critical, relieving Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters, which are more expensive to operate, according to a briefing from the Army’s office for operations, plans and training (G-3/5/7). The CH-47s were then more efficiently used for missions that required vertical airlift.

When the first two C-27Js were deployed to Afghanistan last summer, they were under the tactical control of the commander of the Army’s 159th Combat Aviation Brigade in the southern part of the country. Members of the 179th Air Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard and Army Guard crews from Georgia and Oklahoma flew the planes. Army Guard pilots were trained on the aircraft when the program was still joint.

Because the Army CAB commander had tactical control of the aircraft, he was able to “dynamically re-task” missions, meaning change them at the last minute to address higher-priority needs. According to the Army briefing, 52 percent of planned C-27J sorties in Afghanistan changed within the 96-hour scheduling cycle.

In an early draft of the Jan. 27 MoU, the Army’s tactical control of the Air Force squadron and its aircraft was removed, causing the Army’s G-3/5/7 office to recommend the Army not sign it.

“G-3 non-concurs with the currently proposed MoU as it is written,” the G-3/5/7 briefing says. “Even though the current expeditionary airlift squadron is achieving a measurable level of success [tactical control] to the CAB commander, a change to this command relationship would drastically reduce the flexibility and the habitual relationship that underpins the current success.”

According to an Army aviation official, the first draft of the MoU was rejected by the Army and the Air Force and sent back for revision.

“There was a lot of negotiating to reach a final deal that the Army and Air Force felt comfortable with,” the Army aviation official said. In the end, an agreement was reached that the Army staff supported. So Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno signed it, the official said.

During a Jan. 27 budget briefing at the Pentagon, Odierno said, “We’ve been working this for a few months. It’s important to us that we have direct support to our units out in Afghanistan and wherever we might deploy. It’s a concept actually we tested while I was the commander in Iraq, and I thought it was a very successful test. So I’m comfortable with that. So we’ll mitigate the loss of the C-27. I’m not sure we’ll be able to completely mitigate it, but that will help at least, as we’re deployed, to mitigate that problem.”

The final MoU affirms the benefits of giving the senior Army aviation authority on the ground tactical control of the aircraft and having the Air Force’s expeditionary airlift squadrons co-locate with the Army combat aviation brigade.

However, the document adds that “the combatant commander/ Joint Force Commander may apportion sorties from the general support airlift with [the tactical control] retained by the [Commander of the Air Force] Forces.”

By leaving both options for providing direct support on the table, the services are giving the commander in the field the choice to decide what is best, the Army aviation official said.

For others in the Army, providing both options is cause for concern.

Several Army officials who reviewed the MoU said it provided the Air Force room not to perform the mission as the Army intended to support it.

One Army aviation official said the Air Force could now meet the terms of the MoU using a C-130 unit located at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan to support an Army CAB flying daily missions in Kandahar, making it difficult to respond to emergencies.

By keeping the planes in the larger pool, the Air Force can task them more efficiently than if they were sitting on a runway waiting for a mission, an Air Force official said.

The debate will only continue as the Army and Air Force review the 2009 concept of employment, with the goal to “incorporate lessons learned from combat experience in providing direct support and [time-sensitive/mission-critical] intra-theater airlift into joint doctrine,” the Jan. 27 MoU says.

http://www.defensenews.com/article/2012 ... |FRONTPAGE

[richelieu]

E, in alto loco, c'è chi vuole vederci chiaro .....

Senators Tell USAF to Prove C-27 Cost Claims

Mar. 20, 2012 - 04:12PM
By MARCUS WEISGERBER

U.S. senators are demanding that the Air Force explain the metrics it used to estimate the lifetime cost of operating the C-27J cargo plane, which the service has proposed canceling in the Pentagon’s 2013 budget proposal.

Democrats and Republicans, primarily from states where Air National Guard units fly or are slated to fly the aircraft, questioned the Air Force’s rationale for scrapping the fleet of 21 purchased aircraft.

Thus far, the Air Force has yet to provide congressional defense committees with the metrics it used to determine that each C-27J would cost $308 million over its lifetime, which the Air Force used in its rationale to terminate the program.

Lawmakers and defense analysts have questioned the lifecycle costs, particularly because three Air Force assessments of these costs vary between $111 million and $308 million per aircraft.

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and other members of the panel questioned Air Force Secretary Michael Donley and Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz about the varying C-27J lifecycle cost estimates during a March 20 hearing.

“There’s a big gap there that I don’t think they adequately explained at all here today,” Levin said after the hearing when asked about the $200 million gap in the estimates.

The committee will continue to look at this issue during its markup of the Pentagon’s 2013 budget proposal, he said.

“We’re not going to take any actions until we’ve had a chance to markup the bill,” Levin said.

An Air National Guard unit in Levin’s home state of Michigan is supposed to receive C-27Js.

One Air Force analysis of the Alenia Aermacchi C-27J shows that each plane would cost the service as little as $111 million, but cautions that additional factors could push the estimate above $200 million over a 30-year period.

That estimate is still well below the $308 million figure the service provided to Congress. The number was repeated by Schwartz at a Feb. 28 House Armed Services Committee hearing.

The $111 million lifecycle estimate is listed in a draft cost-benefit analysis of the twin-engine C-27J and the quad-engine Lockheed Martin C-130H. The 2012 Defense Authorization Act required the Air Force to conduct the assessment that gleaned the $111 million figure. Although dated February 2012, the Air Force has not provided the report to Congress. Defense News obtained a copy of the 13-page report on March 19.

The Air Force called that assessment a “draft report” that was prepared by a Pentagon action officer last fall and “pre-dated” for release in February 2012, according to Kevin Williams, deputy director of the Air Force’s studies and analyses, assessments and lessons learned directorate (A-9).

“As it went through the coordination process, it became apparent that the initial number, $111M was incorrect,” Williams wrote in a statement provided by a service spokeswoman. “A more current, updated version of this document is almost fully coordinated and we expect to send it to Congress in the near future.”

Asked about the lower $111 million lifecycle cost estimate during a March 16 briefing at the Pentagon, Williams told reporters and think tank analysts that any reference to that number was “preliminary” and possibly from a “piece of staff work from last fall, where some things were being bounced around.”

“$111 [million] has never been published by anybody in A-9,” he said last week. “It doesn’t exist in any formal, authorized, signed document.”

Still, three separate Air Force reports show a nearly $200 million difference in opinion.

The large discrepancy between the numbers in the three reports have left lawmakers scratching their heads and questioning the reliability of the lifecycle estimates of the C-27J, an aircraft built to shuttle troops and supplies around the battlefield.

“What I’ve seen trickle out of the Air Force over the past six weeks is confusing to say the least,” Sen. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, said during the hearing. “That data has been inadequate, inconsistent. It’s left us all with more questions than answers.”

The Ohio National Guard operates the C-27J and has deployed with the aircraft to Afghanistan.

While the Air Force cites the $308 million figure, an Air Force background paper states one C-27J aircraft will cost $270 million per aircraft. If operated like C-130s, the C-27J could cost as little as $166 million per aircraft.

And yet the newly unveiled draft cost benefit analysis, which the Air Force says was written in the fall, compares the C-27J to the C-130H. The document notes that the $111 million estimate represents “best case” scenarios, when the aircraft is operated like a C-130. The “Air Force Service Cost Position” — which factors in different crew ratios, maintenance, flying hours and basing — could top $200 million.

At the March 20 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Schwartz said the C-27J flying hour cost is much higher because contractors maintain the aircraft. The Air Force maintains the C-130.

“There’s a considerable difference in relative expense there that goes into the flying hour calculation,” Schwartz said.

However, Air National Guard and industry officials say the C-27Js that have been flying in Afghanistan since last year have used only a small fraction of the more than $60 million in spare parts the unit deployed with the aircraft. Only about $200,000 has been used, according to these sources.

Also, a November 2011 Air Mobility Master Plan — developed by Air Mobility Command, the division of the Air Force that oversees cargo and tanker aircraft — states the “C-27J training and sustainment (supply chain and maintenance) strategies were assessed by a business case analysis to provide the best value approach for the suitable solutions between organic and contractor support.”

The Air Force has not publicly released the document, which describes the C-27J as “an efficient tool to deliver smaller loads within the Joint Operations Area.”

The lifecycle cost estimates were first questioned by Ohio National Guard Capt. Dave Lohrer, who conducted his own assessment, which disputed the Air Force’s personnel and maintenance projections. Lohrer briefed congressional staffers on his work last week.

Defense News reported Lohrer’s findings on March 12. Since then, the Air Force has questioned his metrics.

“We got the pros, the experts, who actually said, ‘No, that’s not right,’” Williams said last week.

Still, the Air Force has not provided the metrics it used to develop the $308 million C-27J lifecycle cost estimates.

http://www.defensenews.com/article/2012 ... |FRONTPAGE

[richelieu]

Canadesi in agguato?
Dopo quello degli AW VH-71A ..... un ulterione "affarone" era facilmente prevedibile .....

http://goo.gl/E4PPW

[richelieu]

Un lettore aveva scritto ad "Aviation Week & Space Technology" .....

A Measure Of Sense

Aviation Week & Space Technology Mar 19 , 2012 , p. 8
Don Melton (Killeen, Texas)

Here we go again.
We have bought a few C-27 aircraft and mothballed them (AW&ST Feb. 6, p. 31).
The idea to buy them was to support forward units in places like Afghanistan and Iraq that could not be supported by C-130s because of short or nonexistent runways.
Most of the current support of forward bases is done by CH-47s that are costly to operate and maintain.
A C-27 can operate out of 2,000-ft. runways and haul loads needed to support a small forward base.
The C-27 is most probably cheaper to operate than either a C-130 or a CH-47.
Have we shot ourselves in the foot again?
I flew C-7 Caribous in Vietnam operating out of runways that were shorter than 2,000 ft.

Gli risponde ora un professore .....

C-27 Gone For Good Reason

Aviation Week & Space Technology Apr 09 , 2012 , p. 8
Prof. Robert C. Owen
Aeronautical Science Dept.
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
(Daytona Beach, Fla.)

The reader who found the demise of the C-27 in the U.S. Air Force fleet “simply outrageous” misses the point (AW&ST March 15, p. 8 ).
USAF moved away from the aircraft because it offered no unique capabilities to the existing fleet, and strategic and budgetary changes made buying a private-theater airlift fleet for the Army an unaffordable luxury.
Numerous assessments of the Lockheed Martin/Aeritalia C-27, including a 2007 Rand Corp. study that I coauthored, questioned the need for a small-theater airlifter of such bread-and-butter operational characteristics.

As the Air Force later confirmed, the C-27 required almost the same runway length as the Lockheed Martin C-130 and opened up only about 1% more runways in Afghanistan into which bigger airplanes could not operate.
Justification for a niche fleet of short-range, expensive airlifters evaporated as the U.S.’s approach to Afghanistan-type situations altered.

The Army, flush with windfall funds from the canceled Comanche project in 2004, chose the wrong aircraft for its organic, fixed-wing airlift needs.
The service focused on two aircraft—the C-27J and CASA C-295—which were larger than it needed and provided no significant improvement over runway conditions required by the C-130.

The Army has a legitimate need for fixed-wing capability to provide maneuver and administrative support for far-flung field units and to relieve its more expensive helicopters from routine, small-package cargo and personnel movements.
The solution likely would have been a smaller fleet of smaller aircraft with true short-takeoff-and-landing-from-rough-fields capabilities.
If the Army had gone after the M-28 Skytruck or the Viking 400, it would have had a greater chance of gaining its own aircraft to fill its requirements.

Aah ..... questi professori .....

[struzzovolante]

Chissà da chi è pagato questo professore un pò somaro che sostiene che il C-27 ha bisogno più o meno della stessa lunghezza di pista del C-130J. 340 metri contro 430 in atterraggio su piste non preparate e 580 contro 953 in decollo non mi sembrano le stesse distanze, specie se parliamo di teatri operativi nei quali anche dieci metri fanno la differenza. Diffidate dei professori

[richelieu]

..... Diffidate dei professori

Attento Struzzo ..... che se ti sentono quelli che ci governano ora ..... ti spediscono seduta stante in castigo .....



..... e magari ti diffidano anche dall'avvicinarti ad un qualsiasi aeroporto ..... costringendoti pure a traslocare .....

[richelieu]

Da una notizia risalente ad alcuni giorni fa e che mi era sfuggita .....

India could issue a request for proposals (RFP) this year in regard to a 56-aircraft acquisition to replace the Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL)-built HS 748s operated by the Indian air force, with both Airbus Military C-295 and Alenia Aermacchi C-27J likely contenders for the requirement.

L'intero articolo ..... http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl ... el-370209/

Si prospetta dunque l'ennesimo duello fra due velivoli che, pur ricoprendo un ruolo analogo, non hanno di certo le stesse prestazioni .....

Date inoltre le purtroppo non idilliache attuali relazioni fra Italia ed India ..... temo che il "nostro" non abbia eccessive probabilità di vincere questa importante competizione ..... anche se, in passato, Alenia aveva cercato di stringere rapporti di collaborazione col gruppo industriale indiano Tata .....

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl ... rt-226286/
.

[Vultur]

In fondo a me sembra che facciano quasi un complimento al C-27, ritenendolo un costoso doppione del C-130 e quindi in pratica un suo pari. La domanda cruciale quindi sarebbe: "Se posso avere C-130J, perchè comprare C-27?".
Le distanze di decollo-atterraggio sono relative, dipendendo da un sacco di cose come il carico, il vento, le condizioni del fondo della pista, l'eventuale pendenza della pista, ecc...
Ma in fondo tutto questo secondo me conta poco. Nel senso che per rifornire un base avanzata in condizioni favorevoli (cioè quando nessuno spara) varrebbe il discorso di sopra: se la posso rifornire con un C-130J, perchè mandarci C-27 che poi magari devono fare diversi viaggi o comunque un numero di missioni superiore a quello dei C-130?
Al contrario, se la situazione degenera e c'è gente che spara di brutto e anzi non vede l'ora di fare il tiro al piccione con chi atterra o decolla (perchè i movimenti degli aerei a terra e in decollo o atterraggio sono obbligati e prevedibili visti dalla parte di chi spara), le condizioni della pista e la sua lunghezza sono irrilevanti, perchè la chiudono e non ci atterra più nessuno e tutto avviene dal cielo, per esempio con gli sganci LAPES, o con il classico lancio con paracadute. Quindi anche qui, anche se le prestazioni di decollo corto del C-27 sono superiori a quelle di un C-130, non contano nulla, dato che nessuno atterra.
Se poi bisogna comunque atterrare e portare via i feriti, i morti, oppure portare via tutti, è un altro discorso, ma qui però entrano in gioco anche cose come gli elicotteri o il V-22, che di piste non ne hanno bisogno per niente.
Quindi per me il C-27, pur essendo ovviamente un aereo eccellente, può interessare soprattutto solo chi non può permettersi direttamente una flotta di C-130J.
Se a questo poi si aggiunge che per gli americani il C-27 è un prodotto straniero...

[struzzovolante]

...Se a questo poi si aggiunge che per gli americani il C-27 è un prodotto straniero...

L'unica frase che condivido tra quelle che hai scritto nel tuo messaggio. Senza offesa ovviamente, ognuno dice la sua

[richelieu]

Se poi bisogna comunque atterrare e portare via i feriti, i morti, oppure portare via tutti, è un altro discorso, ma qui però entrano in gioco anche cose come gli elicotteri o il V-22, che di piste non ne hanno bisogno per niente.

Ma che sono assai più impallinabili che non un aereo .....

Pensatela come volete ..... ma nessuno mi toglie dalla testa che il C-27J sia rimasto vittima, auspice la Lockheed, delle (mai sopite) rivalità inter-arma che affliggono le forze armate USA ..... nonchè quelle di tutto il mondo .....
Basta rammentare, nel nostro piccolo, quanto abbia dovuto penare la MM per riuscire ad ottenere quel pugno di Harriers .....

[innox]

Ma che sono assai più impallinabili che non un aereo .....

[richelieu]

E ..... sempre a proposito del V-22 ..... una notizia recentissima .....

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl ... co-370618/

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/20 ... h-041112w/

http://theaviationist.com/2012/04/11/osprey-crash/

Non è che questo velivolo, molto più complesso di un normale aereo da trasporto (e al centro, in passato, di feroci polemiche riguardanti la sua affidabilità), fornisca maggiori garanzie di sicurezza .....

[Vultur]

Mica vero: gli elicotteri sono "impallinabili" tanto quanto un aereo, con il fatto però che con gli aerei il nemico può scegliere anche di mirare a bombardare la pista e i piazzali, cosa di cui invece un elicottero non ha bisogno.
Sotto questo aspetto quindi un elicottero è addirittura meno impallinabile di un aereo, specie se nel frattempo qualcuno costringe il nemico a tenere giù la testa (elicotteri d'attacco), perchè un elicottero non ha bisogno di piste, le quali sono vulnerabili.

I crateri sulla pista infatti ne impediscono l'uso agli aerei. I crateri riparati in fretta e furia con la breccia poi rallentano la corsa di decollo, aumentando i metri necessari a un aereo per staccare le ruote da terra. Se la pista fa schifo ed è magari bagnata, fangosa, piena di buche riparate alla meno peggio, tutte le eccellenti prestazioni di decollo a pieno carico di un aereo per me vanno a farsi benedire e tutto diventa una scommessa.
Un elicottero invece aggira tutto questo. Inoltre in queste condizioni, dove un nemico X mira alla pista e agli aerei che ci si muovono sopra, la pista la chiudono, per cui...
In genere, dove si può fare con le ruspe una pista per C-27, si può fare anche una pista per C-130 stracarichi: se posso spianare 700 metri di terreno, allora posso spianarne anche 900 o più.

Se la pista è inagibile, come sopra: la chiudono e tutto ha luogo con i lanci dal cielo o con il LAPES. Il problema con questi però e che: primo, se al vento gli gira male può scassare e sparpagliare il materiale lanciato dappertutto e, secondo, parecchia gente può essere uccisa appena esce a recuperare il materiale piovuto dal cielo.
In queste condizioni quindi bisogna lanciare dall'aria un sacco di roba, perchè si dà per scontato che una percentuale di essa rimarrà comunque irrecuperata, o addirittura cadrà in (grate) mani nemiche. In uno scenario simile quindi, dove più si lancia e più a terra possono recuperare, ci vogliono aerei grossi, che in proporzione significano meno missioni e meno lanci (e meno rischi, meno carburante, meno spese...). Anche gli elicotteri più grossi qui passano in secondo piano, perchè sono troppo lenti e caricano troppo poco in proporzione.

Il LAPES cerca di ovviare alla mancanza di precisione dei lanci dal cielo perchè è in pratica una perdita del carico controllata, a poca distanza dalla pista. Da ciò che so, un paracadute estrattore viene rilasciato dalla rampa posteriore abbassata, un cavo di stoffa lo mantiene semichiuso con un diametro di circa un metro e mezzo. Appena il C-130 arriva sulla pista a circa 200-250 all'ora e con i flaps estratti (che credo bisogna essere bravi perchè si deve mantenere un cargo stracarico appena sopra la velocità di stallo...), il cavo viene tagliato e il paracadute estrattore è libero di dispiegarsi e gonfiarsi completamente fino a un diametro di circa nove metri e tira fuori dalla stiva tutto quanto perfino un camion il fatto è che bisognerebbe ricordarsi di aver tirato il freno a mano e ingranato la prima he he he he heh he, "Piglialo Lassie!", min. 01:14, "Bad Moon Rising", Creedence Clearwater Revival:

[MatteF88]

Questa discussione mi fa venire in mente la battaglia di khe sahn, dove la maggior parte dei rifornimenti venne paracadutata dai C-130..ma forse il parallelo non calza visto che il fatto risale al '68 e il modo di fare la guerra è cambiato da allora..

[richelieu]

C-27J ..... la vendetta .....

While the Air Force leadership seeks to divest the C-27J airlift fleet in Fiscal 2013, saying it cannot afford to keep these aircraft given tightening budgets, the tiny transports are earning high marks from operators in Afghanistan .....

..... dal "Daily Report" dell' AFA - Tuesday April 24, 2012

The Ultimate Flexibility

While the Air Force leadership seeks to divest (1) the C-27J airlift fleet in Fiscal 2013, saying it cannot afford to keep these aircraft given tightening budgets, the tiny transports are earning high marks from operators in Afghanistan.

"While the US Air Force standard mission tasking process requires 96 hours of notice, the C-27J has been 'time on target' in less than 24 hours, while operating under Army tactical control," said Capt. Steffen Landrum, the 702nd Expeditionary Airlift Squadron's liaison officer to the Army's 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, in an Army news report posted on April 23.

Landrum added, "For the troops out in the field, that is the ultimate flexibility."

C-27Js have been operating (2) out of Kandahar Airfield since August 2011 as part of the 702nd EAS.

Based on Landrum's calculations, the Army has saved $30 million during this span by fulfilling some missions with C-27Js instead of CH-47 Chinook helicopters, and the Air Force has saved "more than $3.8 million" by not having to operate strictly C-130s in direct-support roles.

The C-27J is "by far the better choice for the last tactical mile," said Lt. Col. Jeffrey Charette, 702nd EAS director of operations.

House defense authorizers will mark up the Pentagon's Fiscal 2013 budget request later this week, potentially weighing in on the C-27J's fate.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno has expressed interest (3) in retaining the 21 C-27s already in the fleet.

Further, the Coast Guard reportedly is also interested in acquiring the airframes.

(Kandahar report (4) by Richard Barker)

I links dell'articolo .....

(1) ..... http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArch ... arYet.aspx

(2) ..... http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArch ... dahar.aspx

(3) ..... http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArch ... -27Js.aspx

(4) ..... http://www.dvidshub.net/news/87153/clos ... z1svOirYBw

[richelieu]

Ulteriori riconoscimenti .....

Far from DC battles, C-27 gets glowing reviews .....

Fonte ..... http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/04/24/far-f ... g-reviews/


Quest'altra notizia, invece, confermerebbe certi sospetti .....

Pentagon Offers Budget Compromise to Placate States .....

The Pentagon has offered to fund more C-130 aircraft for the Air National Guard to placate state governors complaining about proposed budget cuts that scale back fleet and personnel .....

Fonti .....

http://www.defensenews.com/article/2012 ... /304230010

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Featur ... 12cog.aspx

A questo punto è lecita una semplice domanda: Chi ci guadagna ?

[FAS]

e chi ci rimette.....

vedi affare superjet

[richelieu]

e chi ci rimette.....

vedi affare superjet

Ossia .....
..... è una faccenda che, purtroppo, non ho seguito ..... quindi ..... qualcosa mi è sfuggito .....

[FAS]

dovremmo aprire una discussione separata .,...

[richelieu]

Stelle e Strisce .....

http://www.stripes.com/news/c-27j-trans ... t-1.175223

[richelieu]

Le polemiche continuano ..... un tenente-colonnello dell'USAF di stanza in Afghanistan, intervenendo nella rubrica "Battleland" del settimanale americano TIME in merito ai programmi JSF e C-27J, si pone delle domande .....

Can we afford it?
Do we need it?
Does it work?

ma non ha le risposte .....

The truth is I’m in no position to determine whether either aircraft is affordable or necessary.
Such decisions are rightly reserved for people far above my paygrade.
These truly are complicated questions – cancelling the Spartan and continuing with the JSF may very well be the right decision, given all the other factors in play.
I don’t know.

However, I can say with some confidence that the three questions, difficult as they are to answer, are the right questions.
The key is to keep asking them and to make sure we answer them as honestly as possible.

L'intero articolo ..... http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2012/0 ... t-program/