Nell'articolo del Corriere che hai linkato leggo: "È quanto apprende il Corriere da due fonti occidentali a conoscenza delle discussioni più recenti tra Nuova Delhi e Washington".
Frasi di questo tipo mi lasciano sempre perplesso (per usare un eufemismo si intende.....)
Valerio Ricciardi ha scritto: 10 febbraio 2026, 17:15
Dal Corriere della Sera di oggi, tutto da verificare, è l'unico link attuale che compare se si fa una ricerca per parole chiave;
gli altri sono di luglio scorso. Suggerisco di attendere altri riferimenti, di solito una novità così eclatante avrebbe portato a vederla rimbalzare sui media in brevissimo tempo.
Corriere 10-02-'26.JPG
Infatti ho riportato con le dovute perplessità.
Però era molto che non leggevo nulla di correlato.
I DUE interruttori spostati su cut off in un intervallo di 0,1", se confermato il dato, cosa normale non sono.
"The curve is flattening: we can start lifting restrictions now" = "The parachute has slowed our rate of descent: we can take it off now!" Chesley Burnett "Sully" Sullenberger
Valerio Ricciardi ha scritto: 10 febbraio 2026, 21:49
Infatti ho riportato con le dovute perplessità.
Però era molto che non leggevo nulla di correlato.
I DUE interruttori spostati su cut off in un intervallo di 0,1", se confermato il dato, cosa normale non sono.
Sono d'accordo con Yavapai riguardo l'articolo. Per il resto novità ufficiali non ce ne sono, salvo un controbattere di accuse varie tra vari enti (sono ben riassunte su AvHerald), ma senza ancora nulla di ufficiale.
Senz'altro è un incidente con ancora molti punti interrogativi !!
Paolo
"La corsa di decollo è una metamorfosi, ecco una quantità di metallo che si trasforma in aeroplano per mezzo dell'aria. Ogni corsa di decollo è la nascita di un aeroplano" (Staccando l'ombra da terra - D. Del Giudice)
[...] ...Air India pilot did turn off fuel switches before crash disaster, Western sources claim
Yes, it's the Daily Mail,
but appears to be well sourced and saying it was almost certainly an intentional act:
A pilot in charge of flying the Air India plane that crashed last June (2025), killing 260 people, turned off
the (FCS)fuel switches in a move that was 'almost certainly' intentional, Western sources have claimed.
Western sources told Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera that the blame likely
lay at the feet of the plane's captain, Sumeet Sabharwal.
Sabharwal was monitoring the plane at the time of the crash,
while first officer Clive Kunder was in control.
The newspaper reported that investigators have found that the left engine was
shut down before the right one.
Given that captains always sit on the left, the paper reported that this
pattern indicated Sabharwal had turned the engines off.[...]
---------------------
Ps.
Come già detto più volte, non riesco
a credere a un atto voluto
..."staremo a vedere"
lo scritto del Final Report.
.
[…] …The newspaper reported that investigators have found that
the N.1 engine was shut down before the N.2.
Given that captains always sit on the left (pilot Monitor), the paper reported
that this pattern indicated Sabharwal had turned the engines off.[...]
------------------------------
(NB)
.. Altrimenti (il Pilot monitor), come poteva fare
il Reset dei 2 Motori (GEnx 1B)
…Prima, va fatto chiarezza su tutto quello
che è successo prima di fare il reset Motori?!
.
[…]…By Captain (xxxx) ...the Posters are puzzled by the Capt possibly switching off
the fuel switches (FCS) and then waiting 10 seconds to put them back on. This doesn't surprise me that much, considering the "STARTLE FACTOR".
If both engines failed at liftoff, you would want to reset the FCU by going down to CUTOFF,
just like he did.
But an airstart requires, what, on these engines? 270 kts?
Below that speed, you know you have to hand crank it. Right?
But with a loss of all normal AC power can you even do a battery only start?
Maybe the Captain was waiting for the APU to come on line?
Unfortunately for him, the jet was only airborne for 30 Sec.
But it takes 60 Sec. to start up the APU, Right?
When he saw buildings in the window, he could wait no more.
He snapped back up to RUN And it almost worked...
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Ps
Sia per il Com.te, sia per il F/O dell'equipaggio AI-171
"L'unica cosa fuori dai loro pensieri", in quei pochi secondi
di volo dopo la rotazione, era lo “STARTLE FACTOR".
Forse, alla fine, si vedrà scritto il motivo
del famoso “Delay re-lightning start engines".
airplane ha scritto: 2 agosto 2025, 19:12
. >TO LOOK
Completely baseless analysing of this accident (AI-171)
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I am an active B787 senior captain. What I just read in this (AVH "Editorial), does not work out
with any regular cockpit expected behaviour, and contradicts with facts published.
Does anyone believe that the Pilot Monitor (Captain) did recognised dual engine failure, so early after liftoff,
while his attention is to aircraft positive rate of climb, and preparing to raise the gear handle.
Then, immediately he is doing dual engine failure memory item (cut off both fuel control switches) BUT, waits 10 seconds till he, or the PF, puts them back??
Really?
> I myself checked in the last days a similar scenario in a B787 Full Flight Simulator (FFS).
At the same weight, and ambient conditions, configuration and height,
I cut off both fuel control switches (FCS), and put them immediately back .
The engines recovered nicely and I could fly the aircraft out of the situation quite easily.
.
"RICORDARE QUESTO POST"
postato l'anno scorso
(Agosto 2025)
--------------------------------
-Ovvero (la cosiddetta)
“Analisi completamente infondata di questo incidente”
fatta da un Captain senior in servizio su un B787
…Altrimenti (il Pilot monitor), come poteva fare
il Reset dei 2 Motori (GEnx 1B) >Prima, va fatta chiarezza su tutto quello
che è successo prima di fare il Reset motori ?!
(B787 Critical Systems Review)
--------------------------------------
CSRT ANALYSIS.
Upon completing its review, coordinating observations, and conducting an analysis, the CSRT
(Critical Systems Review) concluded the B787 meets its intended level of safety based on (1) the fundamental soundness of the airplane’s overall design and
(2) the effective processes that have been defined and implemented to correct issues that arose
during and after certification.
In performing the in-depth “deep-dive” reviews of components, assemblies, and related processes, the CSRT identified deficiencies that were either
1) already being addressed by FAA/Boeing Continued Operational Safety (COS)processes
2) mitigated by the B787’s redundant system architecture.
The CSRT validated Boeing’s established compliance design and manufacturing processes work in concert
with FAA regulatory requirements and processes to provide a high level of safety for the B787. The CSRT made four recommendations to Boeing to address the issues noted during its review, and made
three observations related to FAA policy and guidance issues. The following is a discussion of the CSRT’s observations of the B787’s critical systems that led to its
recommendations for Boeing and its observations on FAA oversight.
ENGINEERING
The CSRT did not observe any significant issues associated with component and/or system design processes.
However, the CSRT identified some issues and determined they were being dealt with using standard practices.
Although the FAA and Boeing expect first-time quality for every piece designed and built, reality and history
show that defects occur.
The aviation industry has standards and practices to ensure that even when such defects occur, they are identified, understood, addressed, and not repeated. Because of the B787’s conservative design and redundant systems architecture, the B787 program was found to be operating within these expectations.
The deficiencies the CSRT observed are typical of a new airplane model entering service and are being addressed
or have been addressed by Boeing’s product improvement processes or the FAA and Boeing COS processes.
The following CSRT observations applied across the engineering areas/disciplines (systems, structures, and
propulsion) reviewed:
• Requirements flowdown. The CSRT identified inconsistencies in design requirements flowdown and
design verification. For example, in some cases complete and accurate design requirements did not flow down
from Boeing to its primary supplier and then to the involved subtier suppliers. Boeing had established design requirements, but these requirements were inadequately verified and/or validated, resulting in inconsistency
in parts manufacturing, part failures, and operational disruptions such as turn backs and diversions.
• Responsibility. The CSRT identified communication and verification issues along the supply chain.
In some cases, these issues occurred because Boeing or its major suppliers with integration responsibilities did not clearly establish which subsupplier providing components for an integrated system was responsible for a specific
detailed design requirement.
• Design review process/industry design standards. The CSRT did not identify significant issues with design requirements or certification processes; however, it did find instances in which additional Boeing oversight likely
would have helped ensure specified design processes were followed, especially when designs evolved over time. For example, a design feature made it impossible to install a non-impact-resistant fuel tank access door in locations where an impact-resistant door was required. During subsequent improvements to the door design, a poorly executed design change process allowed deletion of that design feature, thereby making the doors interchangeable. The team also noted that when design requirements or processes were unclear, companies along the supply chain made incorrect assumptions and did not always default to their own or industry design standards. In some cases, requirements ambiguity led suppliers to incorrectly assume they successfully met all the requirements. However, the actual requirements had not been satisfied. The suppliers made these determinations independently, without consulting Boeing or the higher-tier supplier.
• New technologies. The B787 employs many new technologies and innovative designs. The CSRT assessed whether technological innovations contributed to the in-service issues reviewed. Although some of the issues the
CSRT investigated were associated with new technologies, it determined the primary cause was not the novelty of the technologies. For example, the cause of a given issue may have been improper implementation of a correct design requirement. The technology was well understood, but some aspect of the design did not meet the requirements.
• New applications of existing technology. Design requirements for new applications of traditional components were not consistently verified and/or validated where these components were installed. The design feature was assumed to be already proven and tested, and the design weaknesses were found when the airplane was in service. Similarly, previous experience with how a system would perform led to inadequate design requirements for the new system.
• Business model. Boeing is responsible for demonstrating and maintaining compliance with FAA regulations. Boeing’s B787 business model uses several levels of suppliers for design and production responsibility.
The CSRT assessed several large components or integrated systems designed by suppliers and integrated by Boeing
into the airplane. Boeing’s approach for the B787 was different from previous airplane programs where it retained
more of the detailed design responsibilities.
The CSRT noted the unique aspects of this approach did not directly contribute to the underlying cause of in-service issues reviewed. The causes typically related to the basic communication and coordination issues that any large and complex new airplane development program may encounter.
MANUFACTURING
The CSRT noted Boeing suppliers experienced some startup issues with the new business processes for the B787.
Under the new approach, certain suppliers manufactured major sections of the airplane, then installed many components and systems into those sections. This new manufacturing strategy magnified the challenges for the manufacturing quality area resulting from the extraordinary number of new manufacturing and assembly processes required for the B787 type design. Before the CSRT review, Boeing addressed these business process issues and made improvements to its quality system. The CSRT recognized the Boeing business model, which uses several levels of suppliers for design and production responsibility, is not new to the worldwide aerospace industry, but noted no other U.S. aircraft manufacturer has shared such responsibility on such a large scale. This led the CSRT to identify areas where FAA policy does not align with Boeing’s new aircraft manufacturing environment that includes intricate international supply chains, novel technologies, and risk management.
The following CSRT observations applied to the manufacturing/quality area reviewed.
• Business model. Suppliers experienced a learning curve when using these new manufacturing and assembly processes with Boeing. In some cases, this learning curve affected the production rate of components. Boeing has since increased support to its suppliers (a large staff of Boeing employees is onsite at some suppliers) and is working to remedy supply chain issues. The CSRT determined suppliers would better be able to assess risk and implement appropriate mitigation plans with a closed-loop system to define and describe the issues to be solved, identify causes, test and validate solutions, and implement and sustain the solutions.
• Structures. The CSRT did not find systemic engineering or design/certification issues during its examination of the horizontal stabilizer and aft fuselage sections, but did review some structural shimming issues directly related to various aspects of the assembly and manufacturing processes.
• Inspection delegation. The FAA and Boeing use inspection delegation, in which inspection responsibilities are entrusted to another party—in this case, lower level suppliers. For some FAA-required inspections, the FAA may delegate the FAA inspection to Boeing’s organization designation authorization (ODA) or supplier designees. For other inspections, such as first article inspections to meet Boeing internal requirements, Boeing may delegate the inspection responsibility to suppliers. The CSRT noted that overall, inspection delegation worked well throughout the supply chain. However, the CSRT observed there are industry standards for inspection delegation (for Boeing’s internal inspections) that include training, testing, and currency requirements for inspectors, but not all B787 suppliers follow these standards.
• FAA policy.
Current FAA policy on acceptance of an aircraft manufacturer’s production capability applies a similar assessment methodology to both the manufacturer of small, less complex aircraft as well as the manufacturer of large, complex transport aircraft with extended international supply chains.
The CSRT observed current FAA certificate management policy does not ensure
the use of a comprehensive risk-based plan.
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