Air India 787 Crash (Thread Generico)

[airplane]

.
(AVH) Editorial “Sotto un Fuoco di Fila”

>Qualcun altro grida:
(AVH) Editorial …GONE TOO FAR.
---------------------------------------------


…Gone too far
By (xxxxx) Aug 4th 2025

(SIMxx) crossed a line with this one - it's one thing to bring knowledge to the discussion, with
industry experience allowing the genuine "What if..." questions to be asked, as aviation industry
incidents and accidents occur and are reported here.

It's entirely another to declare, "In my opinion the likely cause of this accident was ..." - particularly as
the administrator of the website (with an assumed amount of knowledge beyond the general public),
with so little to base it on.

As other commenters pointed out - all of us (Sxxxx, Jxxxx, Cxxxx, etc.) are operating with only partial
knowledge of the facts. We don't have the CVR, the full FDR, etc.
It is premature at best, and irresponsible at worst, to put out to the public, "THIS is what likely caused the
accident." Doing so only undermines the validity of the final report when it does come out, unless you are
lucky enough to be exactly right.


Ps.
L’ho già detto

Si leggono, (in religioso silenzio) “Cazzxxx galattiche”
e “Lenzuolate a 4 piazze”
ma, non si accettano una libera opinione e/o
personali osservazioni.
.

[sigmet]

A quanto ne so è difficile per non dire impossibile che possano sfuggire punti non testati. Il problema è cosa succede nella gestione del problema. Nel caso in esame possiamo essere sicuri che sia stata testata (o meglio, simulata) la combinazione corrispondente allo spegnimento contemporaneo dei due motori mentre che so, l'aereo ha uno specifico assetto (sempreché questo sia preso in conto dal programma)...

Il processo di certificazione avviene passando per tre fasi ovvero :pianificazione (piani del software e quality assurance) , sviluppo (, scrittura codici, verifica e tracciabiltà) e validazione ( compliance del software e review dei documenti per il famoso DO178 C). Solo a questo punto il sistema puo' essere certificato (Type certificate) .
Questo in parole molto povere per descrivere quali siano gli step e le problematiche che sorgono dal momento in cui si fa gestire ad un computer l'intero sistema avionico suscettibile di milioni di interazioni a differenza della strumentazione anni 80 dove erano i singoli componenti ad essere certificati e non tutto l'ambaradan..

[Moth]

Grazie, ottimo a sapersi. Non ho mai trovato materiale su questi argomenti ma perché non ho mai cercato a fondo.

[airplane]

.
B787 Air India Crash

(AVH Tutorial)
Ranting against the (Tutorial) author is inappropriate
-----------------------------------------------------------------

(By xxx ) In the comments section (AVH Tutorial) I see a lot of ranting against the author of this editorial.
Some even try to prescribe what the author is not allowed to publish on his own website.

This is rather disturbing to me, in particular as:

1) In the beginning of the editorial it is clearly stated that this is a personal opinion, which the author is
certainly allowed to express!
cite: "Let me summarize my own opinion on this preliminary report and provide my reasons"

2) Using an editorial, the author purposely separated his declared personal opinions (aka. speculations) from
the ordinary article with the accident report. Such an editorial is not supposed to be purely factual (see 1).

3) To my understanding, the AV Herald has been built up and maintained by the author himself, which
includes countless hours of his personal time. No-one else has the right to prescribe what he can or cannot publish.
Any kind of attempts for information control (or even censorship) are inappropriate.

While readers are certainly allowed to provide feedback and own opinions (that may or may not disprove
the author's opinions), IMHO some of the comments go way too far.

>This is my personal opinion, (your mileage may vary).


------------------
(NO Comment)
.

[musicaldoc]

.
>B787 Air india AI171 Crash

(AVH) Editoriale,
Questa è solo La Parte Iniziale:
-----------------------------------------

Editorial on India B788 at Ahmedabad on Jun 12th 2025, lost height shortly after takeoff, no thrust reported

There is a war of beliefs hitting the world following the crash of Air India's Boeing 787-8 VT-ANB in Ahmedabad on Jun 12th 2025, see our actual coverage at Crash: India B788 at Ahmedabad on Jun 12th 2025, lost height shortly after takeoff, no thrust reported.

One large part of people believe especially following the release of the preliminary report, it had been a deliberate act to crash the aircraft by one of the pilots and based on some unconfirmed and premature newspaper report even point towards the Captain of the flight, another part believe it might have been an accidental flip of the fuel switches, others believe the crash might have been caused by a technical failure.

Let me summarize my own opinion on this preliminary report and provide my reasons:

I believe, that the fuel switches have been moved indeed into CUTOFF and 10 seconds later back to RUN by one of the pilots.
However, not to crash the aircraft but in an attempt to RESCUE the aircraft in accordance with the memory checklist items for dual engine failure.

I believe, the engine run downs began prior to the fuel switch signal transitioning to CUTOFF and the crew reacted correctly according to the memory items for dual engine failure, which require the crew to move both fuel switches to CUTOFF, wait, then bring them back to RUN in order to reset both Engine Electronic Controls (EEC) and also force a switch to the other channel of each EEC in order to relight at least one if not both engines.

Now, how do I get to this opinion? Let me first summarize some of the relevant Boeing documentation, then provide my observations.
..............................................................................................................................................

(AVH) Editoriale,
Questa è solo La Parte finale:
-----------------------------------

SUMMARY

It is therefore obvious that even on the base of the preliminary report the cause of this crash is anything but clear, any conclusion particularly pertinent the fuel switches and unintentional or intentional malicious human activity is completely premature.

As often happens, the humans in the cockpit can no longer defend themselves, and thus become all too easily the scapegoats in the conflict of interest between living parties such as designers, producers, makers, regulators, monitors, airlines, safety departments, dispatchers, maintenance personnel, ground personnel, and even investigators. As such, I always stand by the flight crew until their fault is proven or all other possible causes have been proven to be ruled out.

The investigation principles therefore are clear: rule out all technical possibilities as the cause of an occurrence, only then look at the possibilities for human (intentional or unintentional) action to be the cause.

India's AIB as well as India's Ministry of Transport were sent a copy of this editorial beforehand but did not comment nor did they answer questions to clarify the sequence of events.
..............................................................................................................................................

Ps.

Questo Editoriale pare sia “sotto un Fuoco di fila”;

Perciò, ho voluto dare un’occhiata, ma, ho visto
solo la parte iniziale e la parte finale.

Su queste due parti dell’editoriale, non vedo
niente di strano, anzi sono ponderate.
(Poi con calma lo leggerò tutto).
.

ASSOLUTAMENTE d'accordo con te, il vero unico problema onnipresente sui social è che non si accettano pareri personali altrui, perché la maggior parte di chi ha tempo da perdere sui social lo fa per sparare sentenze assolutistiche, quindi non comprende che qualcuno gentilmente possa esprimere una propria opinione, anche se lo sottolinea che è a titolo personale.

Si chiama proiezione in psicologia/psichiatria, vedi nell'altro quello che invece sei tu.

[airplane]

.

(AVH) Editorial

…”IL PENSIERO DI UN MODERNO ICARO”.
--------------------------------------------------------------

(By xxxxx)
by not flying too close to the Sun, I managed to live a longer than some who seem to engage
in reckless behaviour.

(AVH) editorial piece is based on his own research and drawn conclusions.
They are his opinions.

In an open, free society that we operate in, deductive reasoning is to be tolerated and actually revered.
Some will inevitably dis-agree.

(AVH) Simon rarely if ever removes reader's commentary or issues vehement disagreements with such.
Nor does he overtly castigate those who might diagree with others. You might wish to do the same.

With over 35 years experience in Professional Commercial Aviation, I am receptive to open criticism.
What I am not tolerant of is of others trying to shut down any debate that raise doubts and drawn conclusions.
.

-----------------

[airplane]

.
…”LO VEDO PER LA PRIMA VOLTA”
(lo riporto qui sotto)
----------------------------------------------

[…]
In the takeoff run video you can clearly see that one or both engines are having issues,
vapor expulsions/compressor stalls.
I can see them, two of my friends can see them and chap across the road can see them (on 27" 4K)
What is causing these engine issues is unclear at this time; my guess is fuel.
-
So at or about time of rotation these engine events become terminal and engines rollback.
PF sees on instruments engines rolling back and thinks fuel cutoff switches changed.
PF says Why Did You Switch Off Fuel, PNF says I Didn't.
PF Looks at fuel Cutoff switches and sees them in Run.
Oh (Fxxx) engines have died need to relite them;
So PF cycles the fuel switches in order to relite the engines. […]
-----------

Ps.

Lo già detto più di una volta:
Per ora, non riesco a credere
ad un atto voluto.

(Staremo a vedere il Final Report)

.

[airplane]

.

E’ GIA’ SUCCESSO SU UN B767
DI METTERE ENTRAMBI I FCS SU’ CUTOFF.
---------------------------------------------------

Both engines were inadvertently shut down during climb at 2200 feet.
The pilot failed to coordinate with copilot and inadvertently shut off fuel.

The engines were reportedly restarted at 600 feet over the Pacific Ocean.

The pilot said he had intended to switch to manual control by hitting an electronic engine
control button, but instead he pulled 2 fuel cutoff switchs on the console about two inches away.


Ps.

>B767-N103DA, Tuesday 30 June 1987
This was reportedly the second similar occurrence.
After this event guards were introduced.

.

[airplane]

.

> ...After this event guards were introduced.
------------------------------------------------------------

Ps2

Se ben ricordo,
gli ultimi Switch (FCS) hanno in uscita 8 fili elettrici,
e dotati (sul gambo) della relativa sicurezza meccanica.

Ovviamente
un Tecnico, in attività sul B787, potrà dire dove
vanno a finire i 4 contatti di ogni FCS e la loro funzione.

.

[airplane]

.
>B787 AIR INDIA CRASH

"PARE ...SI RITORNA ALL’INIZIO"
(ACQUA BRUTTA BESTIA)
---------------------------------------


They find likely E/E Bay flooding;

Very interesting, since there was a “New AD”
against E/E Bay insulation
Just days after the Air india AI171 Crash .


Ps.
.

[sigmet]

.

Very interesting, since there was a “New AD”
against E/E Bay insulation [/b]
Just days after the Air india AI171 Crash .


Ps.
.

Non mi risulta. Di quale AD parli?
Quale e' la fonte?

[airplane]

(AVH) Editorial “Sotto un Fuoco di Fila”

>Qualcun altro grida:
(AVH) Editorial …GONE TOO FAR.
---------------------------------------------
…Gone too far
By (xxxxx) Aug 4th 2025
(SIMxx) crossed a line with this one - it's one thing to bring knowledge to the discussion, with
industry experience allowing the genuine "What if..." questions to be asked, as aviation industry
incidents and accidents occur and are reported here.

It's entirely another to declare, "In my opinion the likely cause of this accident was ..." - particularly as
the administrator of the website (with an assumed amount of knowledge beyond the general public),
with so little to base it on.
As other commenters pointed out - all of us (Sxxxx, Jxxxx, Cxxxx, etc.) are operating with only partial
knowledge of the facts. We don't have the CVR, the full FDR, etc.
It is premature at best, and irresponsible at worst, to put out to the public, "THIS is what likely caused the
accident." Doing so only undermines the validity of the final report when it does come out, unless you are
lucky enough to be exactly right.
.

AVH Editorial 6° Observation
-------------------------------------

(AVH) Editorial Questa volta, ho dato un’occhiata alla parte 6° OBSERVATION.

Anche in questa parte, non vedo niente di strano, mi sembra ben ponderata,
Perciò anche qui gridare : (AVH) Editorial …GONE TOO FAR.
è gridare al vento.
----------------------------

Ps.

l’ho già detto e lo ripeto:

Si leggono, (in religioso silenzio) “Cazzxxx galattiche”
e “Lenzuolate a 4 piazze”
ma, non si accettano una libera opinione e/o
personali osservazioni.
.

[airplane]

.
(AVH) EDITORIAL 6° OBSERVATION.

(A completamento, è riportato per intero qui sotto)
---------------------------------------------------------------

The preliminary report makes clear, that the gear lever was still in the down position and was never attempted to be put up. Usually the pilot monitoring - the captain - would announce "positive rate of climb", the pilot flying - the first officer - would then command "Gear up!" and the captain would move the lever and confirm "Gear coming up".

This procedure would likely have the pilot communication "positive rate of climb", "gear up" command and the gear lever put into the up position below 75 feet AGL. However, this did not occur, it is thus likely, that the pilots noticed an anomaly before the call "positive rate of climb".

None of this is mentioned in the preliminary report, hence it remains unclear whether none of these calls occurred - or were just not mentioned in the selective excerpt. It thus also remains unclear why the gear lever was, according to the preliminary report, never moved into the gear up position.

If we assume that one of the pilots intentionally brought the aircraft down, it is quite possible and even likely, that such calls were not made this time. But then in this scenario, why do the engines run down prior to the actual deed of putting the fuel switches intentionally into CUTOFF?

So, we have 6° observations based on the preliminary report, the videos and the Boeing Manuals suggesting that the engines began to run down before the fuel switches were brought into the position CUTOFF.

So, why the fuel switch transition from RUN to CUTOFF and back to RUN?

The memory items for dual engine failure require the crew to place the fuel switches to CUTOFF and move them back to RUN, as the Boeing Manuals make clear (quoted above). It is possible, that the crew was aware of the necessity to wait between CUTOFF and RUN in order to ensure a proper reset of the EECs as shown by simulator tests following incident B787 ANA NH-985.

The purpose of this is simple: Reset the EEC (Engine Electronic Control), and at the same time force the EEC to switch to the other channel, in the hope that this will enable at least one engine if not both engines to recover and run again.

As we know from the preliminary report, this nearly worked, one engine had already started to recover but had not yet reached sufficient thrust to prevent the crash.

Now, the question is what we conclude from the preliminary report's statement reading: "In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so."

This is not a verbatim quote, but a summarizing narrative which does not establish the context of that exchange, and may even be misleading of what was really communicated between the pilots. Only a proper transcript of the entire communication can clarify the context and the exact wording.

Could the scenario be that the crew noticed the engines running down, and after overcoming the surprise effect one pilot reminds the other to perform the memory items - "Did you do the CUTOFF?" and the other responds "No" and now performs these memory items?

I believe therefore, that the transition of the fuel switches from RUN to CUTOFF was indeed done by the crew with intention, as a reaction to observing both engines running down. However, this was not the start of the crash sequence nor was the intention to bring the aircraft down, rather it was the intention to save the aircraft by at least relighting one of the engines according to the checklist memory items.

Why did the engines run down?
This is the decisive question that so far nobody can answer without further evidence, investigation and analysis.
There had been a similar case, in which the crew was able to recover the engines, which triggered the Service Bulletin FAA-2021-0273-0013 Attachment 2 of 2021.

This could be one possibility of how the simultaneous engine run downs could have been triggered by the simultaneous fault of two active MN4s sitting on the two EECs (with the other two inactive MN4s perhaps unaffected). A bump from the runway, the vertical acceleration of the beginning of lift off could have caused the already cracked, weakened solder balls to temporarily open completely and lose contact, causing the MN4s to send a thrust demand below flight idle to the engine control thus causing the engines run down. This is one of many possibilities (however one that is officially documented).

There are certainly other possibilities, too, that need investigation and need to be ruled out.

Is it even possible that two independent systems fail at the same time in the same way?

On Jan 17th 2008, a British Airways B777-200 was on final approach to London Heathrow as flight BA-38, when both engines failed on short final causing the aircraft to touch down hard before the runway (but fortunately within the airport perimeter), see our coverage at: Report: British Airways B772 at London on Jan 17th 2008, both engines rolled back on final approach.

How it was possible that both engines failed at the same time remained a mystery. In all discussions at the time, nobody (including myself) believed that icing might have played a role, how would two fuel lines and fuel filters ice up independently at the same time to block fuel supply to the engines?
The debate of how two engines could run down simultaneously despite being supplied from different fuel tanks and by different fuel lines went on for two years without any resolution, and without any idea that could explain the events, certainly ice was completely ruled out in all these discussions.

On Feb 9th 2010, 2 years later, the British AAIB released their final report, concluding that it was indeed icing, that caused both engines to fail, in a way that nobody had ever anticipated and thought about: Due to the supercooled nature of the wings and fuel lines during the cruise and the engines being at idle throughout the continuous descent, ice crystals were able to build on the walls of the fuel lines. On short final when establishing the aircraft on the glideslope the engines needed to be accelerated causing quickly increased fuel demand, and thus fuel pressure, which broke the ice crystals free from both fuel line walls. These ice crystals simultaneously accumulated at the face of the Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) and prevented fuel from being delivered to the engines. The mystery was suddenly resolved and the whole sequence of events logically and plausibly explained.

I believe we are again against such a mystery and
we might find a similiarly surprising explanation.


Ps.